also to not lag behind others. The way young people choose how to dress, use gadgets, decorate their rooms, and mix their mother tongue with Russian are forms of drawing their own identity, thus 'youth identities in Central Asia are idiosyncratically local and uniquely 'in between', proffering a picture of transition and tension' (p. 48).

Scholars from outside the region faultily assume life in the post-soviet Central Asian states is alike due to the shared history. Bhat similarly argues that 'all 'Central Asia' is comparable to the notion of the 'melting pot' and in the original Soviet-era melting pot young people were brought up in an environment that shaped them according to the so-called Soviet ethos, failing to consider political, socio-economic, and cultural differences' (p. 26). For example, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are resource-rich countries while Tajikistan is not. Kyrgyzstan became an 'island of democracy' in the region during the first decade after independence as it enjoyed both deeper reforms in the market and pluralism in its politics. Although Bhat's field research took place in Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, and Fergana), he generalizes the findings, applying them to the 'the scenario of youth in Central Asia at large' (p. 26). Limiting the focus to Uzbekistan has straightened the overall inquiry, nevertheless, the application of what is only found in Uzbekistan to the region as a whole does not fit because of the apparent political, cultural, and economic diversity.

Despite its shortcomings, Bhat's *Sociology of Central Asian Youth* offers a new beginning for the sociological research of Uzbekistan and Central Asia. The book is a great source and an interesting reading on youth, adolescence, and school-to-work transitions from the Central Asian perspective for scholars of the region and for those who are interested in Central Asian studies in general. Overall, the book leaves the reader wanting towards a deeper focus on Uzbekistan and its unique character.

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Menga, Felippo. *Power and Water in Central Asia*. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. 194 pp. ISBN: 9780367667351 (paper); ISBN: 9781138678033 (cloth); ISBN: 9781315559179 (eBook). DOI: 10.22679/avs.2021.6.2.011

In his book, Filippo Menga makes a comprehensive analysis of the history of water usage in Central Asia, considering the ideological foundations of hydropolitics during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He provides an overview of the negotiations and decisions of the new Central Asian states (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan) concerning the regulation of mutual water resources, with case studies of the Rogun Dam and Kambarata Dam. Russian conquest of Central Asia in the 1860s turned water regulation and the development of water supplement infrastructure into one of the main regional

problems, necessitating intervention by the Tsarist Colonial Administration. This brought rivalry over water usage and distribution to center stage in relations between Central Asian tribal rulers seeking favor in the eyes of the new administration.

In the first chapter, Menga provides a brief review of water-politics relations in Central Asian republics during the Soviet period and for the first twenty years of their independence. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the centralized water policy strategy compelled the new Central Asian states to confront the necessity of developing their own strategy on the one hand, while also requiring them to learn how to negotiate shared common water resources.

The second chapter provides a theoretical analysis for a bulk of models of power and hegemony with its main accents on the neo-Marxist approach of Antonio Gramsci and the post-Modernist approach of Michel Foucault. The author constructs his own power-hegemony model based on a combination of hard and soft power components, and his own model of the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (FHH). This model represents the author's innovative definition of hydropolitics as an essential component of contemporary regional international policy.

The third chapter describes Central Asian water resources from the geopolitical view of the main river locations. Two main rivers, Amu Darya and Syr Darya, represent two different examples of FHH problem solutions. The Amu Darya, which flows across the borders of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, provides a successful example of joint water redistribution and usage, as opposed to the Syr Darya, which flows from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and has become the subject of a constant boundary conflict. First attempts at water regulation were made by the Tsarist government and were limited to maintenance, renovation, and rehabilitation of an existing irrigation network. With the end of the national-territorial delimitation of Central Asia (1924) and the establishment of the five Soviet socialist republics, the Soviet sovereign began to implement its water program. The first plans of water regulation were drawn at the beginning of the 1930s with an initial network of 45 Amu Darya canals in the Fergana Valley, followed by the Virgin Lands campaign intended to increase the irrigated area with over 60 new canals. Nevertheless, the USSR did not abide by UN practices of international water regulation for codification and customization of international water laws. Even years later, the UN Water Convention of 2014 was signed by only three Central Asian States – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. In addition to UN water practices, newly organized independent states were forced to arrange and define their water usage practices through a series of local agreements. These agreements became an urgent necessity in the absence of central planning after the collapse of the USSR and in light of seasonal water usage differences between upstream and downstream countries.

Chapters four and five describe case studies of the Rogun and the Kamberata Dams. Both dams were planned during the Soviet period, but their actual construction started between the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, facing almost insurmountable difficulties after the collapse of the Soviet Union - practically an impossible task for a single

Central Asian State without mutual cooperation. The Rogun Dam on the Amu Darya River was originally conceived by the Soviet Union in the 1960s and was supposed to be the highest in the world, reaching a height of 335 meters. Work on the dam construction started in 1982 and was halted in 1991. More than ten thousand workers and engineers from throughout the Soviet Union were involved in the dam construction. The president of Tajikstan, Emomali Rahmon, declared the Rogun Dam as a national concept and a symbol of Tajik honor and dignity. Construction of the Rogun Dam changed many hands promising to complete it: Russian RusAl in 2005, German companies in 2006, and at least one Italian company, Salini Impregilo in 2016. The first unit of the dam was commissioned at the end of 2018, followed by the commission of the second turbine expected to be completed by the end of 2019 but still under construction to date. Planning for the Kambarata Dam in Kyrgyzstan began in the 1970s. Construction began in the 1980s and ended in 1991. Construction of the Kambarata Dam was supposed to provide Kyrgyzstan with a control tool for the flow of the Syr Darya with negative consequences for neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Similar to the Rogun Dam, the construction of the Kambarata Dam was highly dependent on foreign investments. However, in Kyrgyzstan, in contrast to Tajikistan where Emomali Rahmon completely controls his opposition, the situation is completely different. Kyrgyzstan canceled its agreement on the dam construction with Russia in 2016. Since then, it has had difficulty finding investors to complete the construction. In 2017, the Czech company, Liglass Trading showed interest in the Kambarata Dam construction, but encountered heavy opposition from Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, because of the impact of the flow of water to Uzbekistan.

Chapter six is devoted to Uzbekistan and the history of its hydro-hegemony, initiated by the Tsarist government and reinforced during the Soviet period. Uzbekistan monopolized not only its status as a cotton monoculture producer but also the factual and symbolic meaning of its historic dominance in Central Asia.

The present book is an example of original research that combined two elements: theoretical and ideological aspects of the policy of hegemony based on natural resources (hydropolitics) and an in-depth overview of Central Asian hydropolitics following the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991-2015) as a reflection of this long-time rivalry. The interdisciplinary approach and analysis have the potential to arouse the interest of researchers from different academic backgrounds. The author's original constructions of hydropolitics and domination-based, well-documented case studies without a doubt represent a fresh view of the post-Soviet economic development of Central Asia.

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